On May 17, 1999 , a secret meeting was held in a clandestine room at ISI’s Ojri Camp in Rawalpindi. Present were Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf, and top defense officials and foreign ministers.
General Tauqir Zia began a presentation before the Prime Minister, displaying points on a map and detailing how the Pakistani army had captured several Indian posts, with National Highway-1 as the next target. This was Operation Koh-e-Paima, Pakistan’s plan to infiltrate Kargil and capture Kashmir. General Musharraf assured the Prime Minister that the operation was in its final phase, too late for a retreat. Before PM Nawaz could question, Chief of Staff General Aziz interjected, “Sir, don’t think further. Just give your approval. Your name will be written in golden letters in Pakistan’s history as the liberator of Kashmir.”
Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz warned that this move would breach the promises made to Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. Nawaz responded, “How long will we try to liberate Kashmir through paperwork? Now that we have the chance, we should take advantage of it.”
Following this, PM Nawaz gave the green light to Operation Koh-e-Paima. Pakistani journalist Nasim Zehra detailed this entire incident in her book, ‘From Kargil to the Coup’.
As we commemorate the 25th anniversary of Kargil Vijay, let’s delve into the Pakistani side of the war. How did the Pakistani Army’s “Gang of Four” plan the Kargil infiltration, and how did Operation Vijay thwart it?
The Script Written in 1987: Indian Army Ascends Siachen
On April 13, 1984, under Lieutenant General Prem Nath Hoon’s leadership, an entire battalion of the Kumaon Regiment ascended Siachen. This mission, named Operation Meghdoot, irked Pakistani dictator General Zia-ul-Haq. Infuriated by the Indian Army’s success on Siachen, he ordered attacks on Siachen.
In 1986, Pakistan’s Special Service Group captured a peak west of Siachen, naming it Quaid Post after Muhammad Ali Jinnah. The next year, under Captain Bana Singh’s leadership, the Indian Army recaptured this post, renaming it Bana Post.
After these conflicts, political agreements continued between India and Pakistan, but Brigadier Pervez Musharraf couldn’t digest the defeat. In 1987, Zia-ul-Haq appointed Musharraf as the Special Service Group commander, who then presented a detailed plan to capture Kargil and Siachen. However, Zia-ul-Haq wasn’t ready at that time.
General Musharraf Becomes Army Chief in 1998: ISI Labels the Plan Strategically Unsound
In 1998, PM Nawaz Sharif appointed General Musharraf as the Army Chief, bypassing two senior generals. Musharraf, still smarting from the Siachen defeat, began working on the old plan to capture Siachen and Kargil. Nasim Zehra notes in her book ‘From Kargil to the Coup’ that even before Musharraf became the Army Chief, the Pakistani army had sent this plan to the Planning Directorate. It was then reviewed by the Director General of Military Operations and ISI.
ISI, in its report, declared the plan tactically sound but strategically flawed, as holding onto the captured territory long-term would be impossible. General Aziz Khan, however, disagreed, believing it was feasible, especially during winter when both armies vacated the peaks.
The US Meeting in 1998: Pakistan Prepares for Infiltration
On September 11, 1998, at the United Nations General Assembly in New York, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Pakistani PM Nawaz Sharif shared a meal, discussing shared histories and potential peace initiatives. Following this, in October, the Pakistani army began preparing for an attack on India, with Musharraf giving oral approval for Operation Koh-e-Paima.
Preparation for Infiltration: Helicopters and Hungry Soldiers
By January 1999, Pakistani soldiers, trained for mountain warfare and adept at walking and fighting in snow, began infiltrating the Indian side of the border. They transported arms and supplies using Russian MI17 helicopters, assembling heavy artillery piece by piece on the peaks.
NLI Unit 8’s Lieutenant Mohammad Majualla Khan noted in his diary, “The weather is terrible. It’s snowing. Listening to ‘Dil Se’ and ‘Kuch Kuch Hota Hai’ songs. After many days, the party brought us rations last night. We got cigarettes, dry fruits, milk powder. All is well now.” This entry reflects the dire conditions faced by the Pakistani soldiers.
Discovery and Indian Response
On May 3, 1999, shepherd Tashi Namgyal and his companions saw suspicious activities and reported them, leading to Lieutenant Saurabh Kalia and five soldiers patrolling the area. They were attacked, and Kalia was captured, revealing the scale of the Pakistani infiltration.
India launched Operation Vijay on May 10, 1999, to reclaim the occupied posts. The intense battles, including the significant Tololing peak victory, showcased the valor and strategy of the Indian Army.
Victory and the Aftermath
By July 8, 1999, Indian soldiers captured Tiger Hill, raising the tricolor flag. Over 200 Pakistani soldiers’ bodies were found, with documents identifying them. Despite their sacrifices, Pakistan denied retrieving their bodies.
Summing Up
The 25th anniversary of Kargil Vijay reminds us of the bravery and sacrifices of the Indian Army. Despite Pakistan’s strategic plans and initial successes, Operation Vijay not only thwarted their ambitions but also highlighted the resilience and tactical brilliance of the Indian armed forces.
